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COMMENTS
CAMPAIGN FINANCING OF INTERNAL
UNION ELECTIONS
Until 1959, internal union elections were conducted free of
federal interference.' In that year, Congress, prompted by reports
of "shameful and unsavory" 2 activities within the labor movement,
enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (LMRDA).s The Act legitimated federal intervention in
internal union affairs, sparking an immediate torrent of commentary 4 which has continued to this day.5
The regulation of "employer" 1 campaign contributions in
union elections is one of the most recent issues to emerge in the
1 State regulation of union elections was a possibility, but enactment of such
legislation was rare. See Rezler, Union Elections: The Background of Title IV of
LMRDA [hereinafter cited as Rezler, Elections], in SmNcosrum oNr LMRDA 475,
476-82 (B. Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Sm:posrum]; Comment, The
Problem of Union Corruption and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 38 TEx. L. REv. 468, 484-85 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Union
Corruption].
2 SENATE SETEcT Coz--. ON ImPROPER Ac-nvrrEs IN TmE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, INTERMs REPonT, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958)

[hereinafter cited as McCLELr-AN Commnd. REP.]. See generally, e.g., J. HurcmNsoN,

THE I PERFECT UNION (1970); R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WrrmiN (1960); J.
McCLELA, CRME WrmouT Pu isHmENT (1962); see also SENATE SEr T CoMiM.
LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, FINAL REPORT,
SENATE SETEcT Commi . oN
IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, SECOND INTERIM

ON IMPROPER AcTIvrrms IN THE

S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1960);
IMPROPER AcnrvrIs

S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
3 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1976)) (sometimes referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act).
4
See, e.g., 13 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. (1960); Symnosrum, supra note 1; Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (pts. 1 & 2), 73
HAv. L. REv. 851, 1086 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions under the
Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MIcE. L. REv. 819 (1960); Symposium, The LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 659 (1960);
Comment, Union Corruption,supra note 1.
5
See, e.g., J. BErLACE & A. BEEtowrrz, TIE LANDRum-GRIUTIN ACT (1979)
[hereinafter cited as J. BELLACE]; D. McLAuGIB.N & A. Scuoom KxxR, THE LANACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY (1979) [hereinafter cited as D.
DRUM-GRIuI
McLAucGi=N]; Bellace, Union Trusteeships: Difficulties in Applying Sections 302
and 304(c) of the Landrum-Criffin Act, 25 Ad. U. L. REv. 337 (1976); Fox &
Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten
Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1980); James, Union Democracy and the
LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 247 (1978); Kratzke, Fiduciary Obligations in the Internal Political
Affairs of Labor Unions under Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 18 B.C. IhNus. & CoM. L. REv. 1019 (1977).
6The terms "employer" and "outsider" are used interchangeably throughout
this Comment. If construed broadly enough, the term "employer" could include
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continuing interpretation of the LMRDA. The Act flatly proscribes both union and employer contributions; its broad, unequivocal language is deceptively dear.7 For years, in fact, the courts
routinely prohibited the use of union funds to promote the candidacy of a contender, usually the incumbent s for union office.
The use of employer funds, on the other hand, was usually ignored 9
-probably because challengers, those who relied most on outside
support, rarely won elections.' 0
In the last year, however, the federal courts have been forced
to confront directly the statutory proscription of use of employer
moneys in union campaigns.". New questions have emerged: Who
-outside the union-can contribute to a union election? How
broadly should the term "employer" be construed? Do outsiders
have a constitutional right to express their support for a union
candidate through campaign contributions? And finally, if the
courts do opt for an extremely broad interpretation of the term
"employer," how will union election campaigns be equitably
financed?
virtually any outsider sufficiently wealthy to make a meaningful contribution. See
James, supra note 5, at 283; Rauh, Outsiders' Assistance in Union Elections, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1977, at 25, col. 3.
7 Section 401(g) of the LMRDA reads:
No moneys received by any labor organization by way of dues, assessment, or similar levy, and no moneys of an employer shall be contributed
or applied to promote the candidacy of any person in any election subject
to the provisions of this subchapter. Such moneys of a labor organization
may be utilized for notices, factual statements of issues not involving candidates, and other expenses necessary for the holding of an election.
29 U.S.C. §481(g) (1976).
The session law differs slightly from the Code. The former bars contributions
"in an election subject to the provisions of this title." Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 401(g),
73 Stat. 519, 533 (1959) (emphasis added).
8 See notes 93-107 infra & accompanying text
9 See, e.g., SE.NAT.E Coavrv. oN LABOR AND PuBrc WELFARE, LABoR-MANAGEMENT REPORTmG AN Discr.osunE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 [hereinafter cited as SENATE LABoR ComEm. BEP.], reprinted in [1959] U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2318, 2320, also reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATVE
I-hsTORY OF THE LABoR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DrscLOsuRE ACT OF 1959

397, 400 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST.]; note 168 infra.
'0 Mere violation of § 401(g) is insufficient to void election results. The court
must find that the violation "may have affected the outcome of an election."
LMRDA, §402(c), 29 U.S.C. §482(c) (1976) (emphasis added). See Beaird,
Union Officer Election Provisions of the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 51 VA. L. IEv. 1306, 1331-35 (1965). Thus, if the challenger has
accepted employer funds and lost, the violation will not be challenged. Further, if
the incumbent has accepted funds and won, the challenger is unlikely to file a
complaint because he too "has usually received some form of outside support and
does not want a ruling on the scope of the prohibition." James, supra note 5, at 282.
11 See notes 26-41 infra& accompanying text
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This surge of interest in outsider support of union elections is
not surprising. Watergate made it painfully clear to the American
public that money and politics often mix-with dangerous consequences. 2 In addition, a series of hotly contested and widely
publicized union leadership races have dramatically raised the question of equitable union campaign financing. The ascendancy of
I.W. Abel of the United Steelworkers in 1965,13 the defeats of
James B. Carey and W.A. "Tony" Boyle, presidents of the Electrical
Workers and Mineworkers unions, respectively, 14 and most recently,
the bitter 1977 battle between Lloyd McBride and Edward Sadlowski of the Steelworkers, 15 all provoked accusations of outside employer help. The last campaign was followed widely by the press,',
and even inspired a sparring match on the editorial pages of the
New York Times.
The polar opinions expressed in the Times are instructive.
Sadlowski attorney Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., who supported outsider
contributions, reasoned that "without support from the publicfinancial contributors, volunteer workers, public-interest lawyersthe challenger to the union hierarchy would never have a chance." 17
Three weeks later, the Times editorialized in response: "Contributions from non-union sources raise a considerably greater threat,
even one of corruption. . . . To encourage external contributions
is to open the way to contributors seeking to buy something other
than the well-being of a union or of the labor movement." 18
These two views form the horns of a dilemma that will reappear throughout this Comment. 19 Ironically, despite the divergence of the views, both rely on an uncompromising reading of the
LMRDA and its goal of "union democracy." 20 Proponents of
12 See, e.g., B. STOUT, MoNEY/PoLrIrcs: A REPORT OF T

CITIZENS' RESEARCH

CoN
ENcE 8 (1974); Alexander, Rethinking Election Reform, 425
(May 1976).
3
See J.D. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, CoMPA-IvE UmoN DEMocRAcy 329-33
(1975) [hereinafter cited as J.D. EDnLsmtiN]; J. HERLiNG, RIGHT TO CHAXENGE:
PEOPLE AND PoWER IN Tm STEELWoRKERS UNION (1972).
FOUNDATION
ANNALs 1, 2

14 See J.D. EDnELsTEN, supra note 13, at 319-28.

15 See James, supra note 5, at 348-49.
16 See, e.g., Raskin, Steel Union Election Is Awaited as Key Test in Organized
Labor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1977, § D, at 7, col. 1; notes 119-22 infra.
17 Raub, supra note 6.
18 Union Funds for Union Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1977, § A, at 22, col. 2.
t9 See notes 43 &44, 48, 89, 108-11 infra &accompanying text.
20 See notes 56-68 infra & accompanying text.
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outsider support, citing congressional incantations of "union democracy" and "free and democratic" elections, claim that democracy is
illusory unless rank-and-file challengers are accommodated in the
political process. That, they say, requires outside money. Opponents of outsider support, citing the same congressional formulae,
urge that democratic elections are not possible unless outside influence and tampering are avoided. Thus, merely parading behind
a banner of "union democracy" will do nothing to resolve the
stand-off.
A more profitable approach to the problem must begin with
the realization that the term "democracy" is not self-defining. The
legislators who enacted the LMRDA did not bother to explain the
term; 21 "democracy," after all, is a concept taught in grade school.
Congress specifically rejected the New England town-meeting model
of democracy, 22 but it is not at all clear which of several remaining
democratic models underlies the LMRDA. Did Congress intend to
transplant traditional representative-democracy principles--in which
one person from the rank and file is chosen to speak for an entire
constituency-to the union setting? Was the intent of the legislature to supplant the autocratic nature of union politics with vigorous two-party competition? Or would Congress have been satisfied
with the one-party politics-in which the democratic battles are
fought at the "primary" stage-then existing in many regions of
the country?
These questions may at first appear abstract, theoretical, or
even philosophical. But they are highly relevant in determining
how union elections should be structured and financed. A campaign between two members of the union hierarchy may well be
considered democratic by traditional American standards, as would
a campaign between two rank-and-file candidates or between an
incumbent and a rank-and-file challenger. Despite the common
label of democracy, however, the financial requirements of the
candidates in each of the three campaigns would be quite divergent.
Also, a political structure which legitimates opposition through the
21

The Senate report accompanying the LMBDA did state, however, that

democracy required "the opportunity to influence policy and leadership by free and
periodic elections." SENATE LABOR Comm. REP., supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in
[1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2318, 2323, also reprinted in I LEGiS. HisT.,

supra note 9, at 403. See also Summers, The Public Interest in Union Democracy,
53 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 610, 613 (1958).
22

SENATE LABOR COMM.

EP., supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in [1959] U.S.

CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2318, 2323, also reprinted in I L~is. HIST., supra note
9, at 403.
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creation of permanent parties 23 will function much differently than
a structure in which challengers emerge from the ranks with no
formal, permanent power bases and with limited financial resources
behind them. Yet both structures will be called "democracies." 2
This Comment examines the internal political structure of the
American labor union and concludes that, as presently written and
interpreted, the campaign financing provisions of the LMRDA are
inadequate. They are designed for a two-party system which simply
does not exist in a union setting. In part I, the Comment discusses
Marshall v. Local 20, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,25
the first case to grapple with the outsider-funding issue. Part II
explores the legislative history and underlying rationale of the
LMRDA and proposes that the campaign financing provisions are
rooted in two congressional objectives: eliminating corruption and
fostering responsive leadership. In connection with the latter
rationale, this part also describes the problems inherent in entrenched leadership and how the LMRDA election provisions attempt to cope with these problems. Part III focuses specifically on
section 4 01(g), the campaign financing provision. This part analyzes the judicial interpretations of section 401(g) and suggests that
the reason for the failures of the section is that the courts-and even
the literal wording of section 401(g)-neglect to take into account
the gross disparities in strength and resources between incumbents
and challengers. Finally, in part IV, an alternative reading of
section 401(g) is examined, and several new legislative approaches
are proposed.
2

3 This type of structure has apparently been successful only once in the
American labor movement. The International Typographical Union maintained an
elaborate two-party system for many years. See S. Ln'sEr, M. TRow, & J. Cor.MANq, UNION DEMOCACY (1956) [hereinafter cited as S. LIPsET].

Because the financing requirements of election campaigns are so dependent on
the particular model of democracy involved, any decision on union campaign
financing must await an analysis of the form of democracy in the union setting.
24 There are a number of excellent commentaries which explore the nature of
union democracy. See J.D. EDELSTEIN., supra note 13; C. KERR, UN0ONS AND
UNION LEADERS OF THEm OWN CHOOSING (1957); W. LEnsmisoN, AMEIuCAN TRADE
UNION DEMOCRACY (1959); S. Lns.T, supra note 23; P. TAFr, THE STRUcTrE
AND Gov UiMENT OF LABOR UNIONS (1954); Lipset, The Law and Trade Union

Democracy, 47 VA. L. REv. 1 (1961); Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The Futile
Quest for Union Democracy, 12 INDUs. & LAB. BEL. 1Ev. 503 (1959); Stein, The
Dilemma of Union Democracy, 350 ANNALS 46 (Nov. 1963). For a discussion of
union democracy in Europe, see A. CAREw, DEMOCRACY AND Goy rimENT IN
EURoPEAN TRADE UNIONS
WEsTErNr EUROPE (1961);

(1976); W.

GAr.NSON, TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY IN

J.

GoLrSTEN, THE GOVERNMENT Or BmrsH TRADE
UNIONS (1952); J. HurEs, TRADE UNION STuCTURE AND GOVERMENT (pT. 2)
(1967); 0. KAHN-FREuND, LABOUR AND THE LAw (2d ed. 1977). For an early
perspective, see S. WEBB & B. WEBB, INDU5TRiAL DEMOCRACY (ed. 1920).

25 101 L.R.R.M. 2195 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).

1980]

UNION CAMPAIGNS

1099

I. RECENT CASE LAW

The first case to deal directly with the question of outsider
campaign contributions in union elections was Marshall v. Local 20,
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters.28 In that case, the Secretary of Labor brought suit against the local, 27 alleging that "moneys
of an employer" were contributed to the campaign of the successful
presidential candidate, Harold Leu, in violation of section 401(g)
of the LMRDA. Some of Leu's contributors were "employers" 28
in a technical sense-his doctor, for example, and other personal
friends-although they certainly had no relationship with the
29
union.
The Secretary nonetheless contended that these contributions
were improper. He cited Labor Department regulations which state
that: "The prohibition against the use of employer money . . . is
not restricted to employers who employ members of the labor
organization in which the election is being conducted, or who have
any business or contractual relationship with the labor organization." 30 The Secretary argued that section 401(g) has no limit.
In his view, it applies to all employers, even those having no re26 Id.
27 The Secretary's suit was brought pursuant to his powers under § 402 of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1976). Section 402(a) authorizes an individual union
member who has exhausted his internal appeals to file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor alleging election irregularities. Id. § 482(a). Section 402(b)
provides:
The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter [(title IV)] has
occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the
filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization
as an entity in the district court . . .to set aside the invalid election, if
any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon
the removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary ....
Id. § 482(b). See generally J.BEErAcE, supra note 5, at 228-82; Note, The
Enforcement Power of the Secretary of Labor Under Section 402 of the LMRDA,
1971 U. It.L. L.F. 745.
28
'Employer" is defined as:
any employer or any group or association of employers engaged in an
industry affecting commerce (1) which is,with respect to employees
engaged in an industry affecting commerce, an employer within the
meaning of any law of the United States relating to the employment of
any employees or (2) which may deal with any labor organization concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work, and includes any person acting directly or
indirectly as an employer or as an agent of an employer in relation to an
employee but does not include the United States or any corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof.
LMRDA, §3(e), 29 U.S.C. §402(e) (1976).
29 But see note 31 infra.
3029 C.F.R. §452.78(b) (1979).
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lationship with the union and no demonstrable interest in the
outcome of the election.3 '

The defendant union challenged this broad construction of the
term "employer." It claimed that the rationale behind section
401(g)'s proscription of employer contributions was to prevent employers from unduly interfering with the internal structure of their
own employees' unions. The union argued that a more sweeping
ban on outside assistance would foreclose the opportunity of virtually any challenger to mount a successful campaign, and would
undermine Congress's aim of encouraging free and democratic union
elections. 32 Thus, in the union's view, both the regulation and the
Secretary's limitless application of section 401(g) were invalid.33
The union also challenged the Secretary's construction of the statute
on constitutional grounds, claiming that an interpretation that prohibited all disinterested-employer campaign contributions would
34
violate potential contributors' first amendment rights.
The district court rejected the union's analysis. The court
held the regulation valid, and said that the regulation forbade the
contributions from Leu's doctor and personal friends. 35 The court
was nonplussed by the union's arguments, and stated baldly that
"an incumbent always has the advantage in an election." 31 Emphasizing the spectre of corruption and influence-buying which
would result from a more limited construction of the word "employer," the court intimated that-if it had its way-no outsider
could contribute to a union election:
When the contest is not in the public arena, but in a
private organization, the rules must clearly and definitely
forbid outsiders from putting their weight on either side.
When, as here, the contest is among members of labor,
management of any kind has no business with it, and must
31
See 101 L.R.R.M. at 2196; Brief for Appellee at 10-18, Marshall v. Local 20,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir.), af'g 101 L.R.R.M. 2195 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) [hereinafter cited as Secretary's Brief].
The Secretary could have argued for the same result in Local 20 without
interpreting "employer" so broadly because one contribution in fact came from an
employer of members of Local 20. See Secretary's Brief, supra at 6. The relationship of other contributors to the union is unclear. See id. 6-7, 24-26.

32 101 L.R.R.M. at 2197.

33 Id. The union need not have argued that the regulation was invalid; the
regulation can be reconciled with a narrow interpretation of "employer." See
note 186 infra and text accompanying notes 186-89 infra.
34 611 F.2d at 652.
35
Marshall v. Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 101 L.R.R.M. 2195 (N.D.
Ohio), af'd, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).
36 Id. 2197.
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be barred from getting involved either directly or in37

directly.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed.3 8 Judge Phillips, stressing the
"clear" language of the provision,3 9 found support in the legislative
history for his contention that: "The purpose of title IV of the Act
[relating to elections] is to prevent the subjugation of the employees'
representative's interests to those of management. Even the most
subtle of influences can produce serious consequences for the loyalty
and integrity with which the union should represent its membership." 40 The first amendment claim was also dismissed, based on
the court's finding of a governmental interest in protecting union
members from any undue influence exerted by outside con41
tributors.
It is not surprising that the Sixth Circuit and both the litigants
in this case found solace in the underlying rationale of the LMRDA.
Running like counterpoint throughout the Act are two distinct
themes: 42 one, an abhorrence of corruption and racketeering (cited
by the Secretary of Labor and by the court); 43 the other, a more
positive insistence on individual rights and liberties (cited by the
union).44 The two are related but are far from synonymous. To
cite one without the other-as the court in Local 20 has done-is at
best misleading. A more thorough analysis of the underlying
rationale of the LMRDA is necessary to correctly resolve the issue.
37Id.

(emphasis added).

38 611 F.2d 645.

Judge Weick dissented, stating that failure to join the

union's president as a defendant deprived him of due process. Id. 653-54.
39 Id. 651-52.
40 Id. 651.
41 Id. 652-53.
The issue of outsider contributions took on a new dimension in 1978 when the
United Steelworkers of America adopted a rule prohibiting the receipt of any outside

support in an election campaign. United Steelworkers Const. art. V, § 27 (1978).
The rule was a direct by-product of the McBride-Sadlowski campaign of 1977, in
which accusations of outside support were incessant. See notes 15-18 supra &
accompanying text and notes 119-22 infra. The rule was recently challenged in
a lawsuit fled by loser Sadlowski. Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, No. 79-2953
(D.D.C., fled Oct. 31, 1979). For a more complete discussion of the Steelworkers'

rule, see Note, Restrictions on "Outsider" Participationin Union Politics, 55 CHr.K~mr L. REv. 769 (1979).
Additionally, winner McBride sued some of Sadlowski's outside supporters,

alleging that their contributions were in violation of § 401(g).
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

The suit was

McBride v. Rockefeller Family Fund, 101

L.R.R.M. 2576 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 612 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. March 31, 1980).
42
See text accompanying note 19 supra.
43
See 611 F.2d at 650-51; Secretary's Brief, supra note 31, at 14-16.
44 See, e.g., 101 L.R.R.M. at 2197.
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LMRDA

The LMRDA was enacted in an atmosphere of heated and
often divisive intensity. As Professor Cox noted in a frequently
quoted 45 caveat written shortly after the passage of the bill:
The legislation contains more than its share of problems
for judicial interpretation because much of the bill was
written on the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives and because many sections contain calculated ambiguities or political compromises essential to secure a
majority. Consequently, in resolving them the courts
would be well advised to seek out the underlying rationale
without placing great emphasis upon close construction of
the words.4 6
The "underlying rationale" to which Cox refers is welldocumented in the legislative history both preceding and contemporaneous with the passage of the Act.4 7 That legislative history makes
45 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 11 n.17 (1973);

Wirtz v. Local 153,

Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 n.6 (1968); UAW v. National Right
to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1148 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Brennan v. United Steelworkers, 554 F.2d 586, 593 (3d Cir. 1977); Usery
v. Local 639, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 387 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
46 CoX, supra note 4, at 852 (emphasis added).
(Because of his participation
in the drafting of the LMRDA, Professor Cox's remarks may carry greater authority
than those of other commentators. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 5992 (1959) (remarks
of Sen. J. Kennedy), reprinted in II LzEis. HIs., supra note 9, at 1025; 105 CONG.
REc. 6281 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in II L zs. HIST., supra
note 9, at 1043.) Although Professor Cox's observations about the legislative
history of the LMRDA apply most directly to titles I & VII, see notes 150-70 infra
& accompanying text, the emphasized words are accurate guides to the entire Act,
and have been used by the courts in interpreting both title IV and § 401. E.g.,
Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 n.6 (1968);
Brennan v. United Steelworkers, 554 F.2d 586, 593 (3d Cir. 1977); Usery v. Local
639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 387 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
47 The complete contemporaneous legislative history is reprinted in I & II
LEGis. HIST., supra note 9.

The Act was a specific response to the first interim report of the McClellan
Committee, and both the Act and the accompanying reports incorporate prior bills
and reports. See, e.g., SENATE LABoR Comm. REP., supra note 9, at 2, reprinted in
[1959] U.S. CODE: CONG. & An. NEws 2318, 2318, also reprinted in I LEis. HIST.,
supra note 9, at 398; H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in
[1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2424, 2424, also reprinted in I LEGcis. Hisr.,
supra note 9, at 759, 759-60. Congress also responded to the Second Interim
Report of the McClellan Committee. Id. 2, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 2424, 2424, also reprinted in I LEGIs. HIST., supra note 9, at 760;
Levitan & Loewenburg, The Politics and Provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act
[hereinafter cited as Levitan], in REGULATING UNION

Estey, P. Taft & M. Wagner eds. 1964).
at

1-8;

Levitan,

supra.

See also

GovERNmENT 28, 54 (M.

See generally J. BELLACE, supra note 5,

REGuLATN G

UNION

GovR mENT,

supra;

SYmposumI, supra note 1; Aaron, supra note 4 (pt. 1); Cox, supra note 4; note 2
supra and notes 49-54 & 150-69 infra & accompanying text.
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clear the two-pronged underlying rationale for the LMRDA: prevention of union corruption and assurance of responsive union
48
leadership.
The origins of both congressional policies can be traced to the
three major sources of pressure for the enactment of the LMRDA.
First, in 1958, the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities
in the Labor or Management Field (popularly known as the McClellan Committee) 49 released its first report, 50 a 462-page collection
of horror stories documenting, inter alia, dictatorial practices by
union leadership, collusion with management, misuse of union
funds, violence, and infiltration of some unions by "gangsters and
hoodlums." 51 The Committee recommended federal legislation to
curb the abuses uncovered during its hearings.8 2 Second, reformers
also supported federal legislation as a means of improving the responsiveness of unions to their members.8 3 And third, management
groups, eager to constrain growing union power through internal
restraints, also pressed for ameliorative legislation. 4 In September,
1959, the LMRDA was enacted. Its purpose was to protect employees and the general public from "breach of trust, corruption,
disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures
to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct." 85
Thus, the congressional policies against corruption and in support of responsiveness have rather logical roots in the arguments
pressed by the most avid supporters of federal legislation. And, as
this Comment shall demonstrate, Congress viewed union democracy
as the means to achieve both policies.
48 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
49

The Committee was chaired by Arkansas Senator John L. McClelan.
REP., supra note 2.
McCr=Ar.x Cor.
5l Id. 4-7.
52 Id. 450-53.
53 Cox, supra note 4, at 820.
54 Id. 820-21; Levitan, supra note 47, at 31-32.
55LMRDA, §2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1976).
The Act is divided into six major parts: a bill of rights for individual union
members, LMRDA, title I, §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976); reporting
and disclosure requirements for both unions and employers, LMRDA, title I,
§§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1976); trusteeships (the regulation of union
control over its own subordinate locals), LMRDA, title I, §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 461-466 (1976); union elections, LMRDA, title IV, §§ 401-403, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 481-483 (1976); safeguards for labor organizations, including the fiduciary
responsibilities of union officers, LMRDA, title V, §§ 501-504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504
(1976); and miscellaneous provisions, LMRDA, title VI, §§ 601-611, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 521-531 (1976). The final part of the Act, LMRDA, title VH, §§ 701-706,
amended various parts of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976).
50
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A. Democracy: The Solution to Union Corruption
The McClellan Committee, after documenting labor misconduct and corruption, suggested that, given the opportunity to participate more actively in union affairs, the union members themselves could cleanse their organizations of corrupt and malevolent
influences. 56 One year later, the Senate report accompanying the
proposed LMRDA noted: "Given the maintenance of minimum
democratic safeguards and detailed essential information about the
union, the individual members are fully competent to regulate
union affairs." 57 The same report added that "[t]he ultimate responsibility rests upon individual union members to insure that
their unions are efficiently and honestly run by taking a more active
interest in the affairs of their organizations." 58
This emphasis on union self-regulation of corruption had
political as well as practical origins. Not surprisingly, many union
officials opposed the idea that the federal government could control
the inner workings of their "private" organizations. 9 In addition,
labor supporters feared that federal intervention could serve only to
weaken the collective strength of unions and undermine their stand
against management. 60 To allay the suspicion that the LMRDA
would reduce union effectiveness, Congress pointedly voiced its
56
57

McCr.a_,.

Commr. REP., supra note 2, at 452.

SENAT.E LBOn Comm.

REP., supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in [1959] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2318, 2323, also reprinted in I LEGis. HIST., supra
note 9, at 403.
58 Id. 12, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2318, 2329, also
reprintedin I LEGIS. HIST., supra note 9, at 408.
59 See, eg., Levitan, supra note 47, at 28, 39-40, 44; 105 CONG. REc. 16,592
(1959) (letter of James B. Carey, President of the Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio,
& Mach. Workers, quoted by Rep. Cramer), reprinted in II LEGIS. HIST., supra
note 9, at 1709.
6 This was a not unreasonable assumption, considering the support given the
LMRDA by traditionally pro-management groups. See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
Further, the attitude was not entirely self-serving-there was a strong argument
that autocracy was better for the union rank and file. A number of com-

mentators-likening labor unions to corporations, universities, churches, or even
armies-note

that

private

organizations

are

often

autocratically

rather

than

democratically run. Such commentators would argue that "too much political and
civil liberty can weaken . . . [a union], resulting in a thinner paycheck." Affeldt,
The Labor Bill of Rights: A Bill of Protest, in SyM'osrum, supra note 1, at 175,
213. See also, e.g., M. Es=-zy, TnE UNiONs 47, 54 (1967); C. Kmm, supra note 24,
at 10; G. Tmz~ra, THE PoLITICAL IMPERATIVE 281-85 (1968); Cox, supra note 4,
at 829; Kahn-Freund, Trade Unions, The Law and Society, 33 Mon. L. REv. 241,

263 (1970).

One union official even suggests that society approves of more auto-

cratic union leadership-leadership

sufficiently strong to "caution, restrain,

ad-

monish, and even punish" an unruly membership and keep the industrial peace.
G. TyxR, supra, at 285.
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support for a "strong independent labor movement" "1 and emphasized that government interference in internal union affairs would
be minimal. Most of the "policing" which was required would be
done by the union members themselves through traditional democratic mechanisms. 62
B. Democracy and Union Responsiveness
1. The Expectation of Representation
Although the legislators who enacted the LMRDA saw democracy as a means of controlling the union corruption exposed by
the McClellan Committee, "the sources of the statute lay much
deeper than the committee's disclosure." 03 Democracy was favored
in its own right, as an expression of individual freedom. 64 Congress
had, after all, bestowed upon the unions the right of exclusive representation; 05 the individual worker, by virtue of the collective bargaining process, had lost his right to contract independently with
his employer.6 6 The least he could expect in exchange for this
concession was a voice in the internal affairs of his union. The
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare was fully aware of
the federal government's obligation:
Under the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor
Acts the union which is the bargaining representative has
power, in conjunction with the employer, to fix a man's
wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The individual employee may not lawfully negotiate with his employer. He is bound by the union contract. In practice,
the union also has a significant role in enforcing the grievance procedure where a man's contract rights are enforced.
The Government which gives unions this power has an
obligation to insure that the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men and women whom they
61 SENATE LABoR Comm. REP., supra note 9, at 5, reprinted in [1959] U.S.
& An. NEws 2318, 2322, also reprinted in I LEGis. HisT., supra note 9,

CODE CoNG.

at 401.
62

See text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra.
Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MoD. L. REv. 273,
274 (1962).
61 Those who favor union democracy often view unions as mini-governments
analogous to the United States government and formulated from the same principles. See, e.g., Grifn, A New Era in Labor-ManagementRelations, in Symposrum,
supra note 1, at 25, 26; notes 21-24 supra & accompanying text. But see, e.g.,
Summers, supra note 63, at 278.
65 See National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
66 Id.
63
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represent. The best assurance which can be given is a
67
legal guaranty of free and periodic elections.
The mandate is clear: union officers must not only be honest;
they must be responsive to the needs of their constituency.6 8 And
that, thought Congress, was unlikely so long as entrenched, autocratic incumbents remained unchallenged from within.
2. The Perils of Incumbency
In the late 1950s, "one-man dictatorships" 69 were thriving
within labor unions.70 Indeed, unions had proven themselves to be
particularly susceptible to autocracy. 71 Opposition to the union
hierarchy simply was not acknowledged as a legitimate form of intraunion activity.7 2 The two-party system was rare 73 and, even if
periodic elections were mandated by the union constitution, there
was no limit to the number of terms an officer could serve.7 4 This
factor alone had serious consequences:
[B]eyond a certain point, length of service in a leadership
position tends to become self-perpetuating, whether in a
union, business organization, or political position. The
cult of personality becomes increasingly evident, and, as
time goes on, criticism of union policy tends to be regarded
SENATE LABoR Comm. REP., supra note 9, at 20 (emphasis added), reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2318, 2336, also reprinted in I
LEGiS.6 HIST., supra note 9, at 416.
sMr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court in Wirtz v. Hotel
Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 503 (1968), noted pointedly that "benevolent
as well as malevolent entrenched leaderships" were subject to the strictures of the
LMRDA; the mere fact that the entrenched incumbent was "enlightened" was
irrelevant. Accord, Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309,
67

311-12
(1977).
6

9 McCLr.LA Comm.RnP., supra note 2, at 4.
70 See generally, e.g., J. BAmAsH, ARmmcAN UNrONS 93-96 (1967); M. EsTEY,
supra note 60, at 53-56; see also J.HUTCHINSON, supra note 2; R. KENNEDY, supra
note 2; J. McCLE.LAN, supra note 2.

71 See C. KERR, supra note 24, at 10, 12; S. Lnsr, supra note 23, at 4-13;
R. MrcsErs, Por~rrcAL PARTIEs 93-201 (Dover ed. 1959).
The autocratic nature of many unions should not be surprising. The unionespecially at the local levels-is relatively homogeneous in composition and unidimensional in purpose: "The sociologic base is not present for a political pluralism.
Hence, a union official, once elected, can be re-elected without major opposition
for decades." G.TTER, supra note 60, at 284.
72 See M. EsrEY, supra note 60, at 50; S.Lips=r, supra note 23, at 270-305;
James, supra note 5, at 250-51, 265; Lipset, supra note 24, at 40-43. See also note
205 infra & accompanying text.
73 See note 23 supra; Kahn-Freund, supra note 60, at 263-64.
74 Of 111 national union constitutions studied by the Department of Labor in
1958, not one limited the number of terms which could be served. U.S. BuRAU
oF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuiL. No. 1239, UNION CoNsTTrTION
ROVISIONS: ELECTION AND TENURE OF NATIONAL
OFmscuss 21 (1958), cited in M. EsTEY, supra note

AND INTERNATIONAL

60, at 53.
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as criticism of the individual leaders and comes perilously
close to disloyalty, as well as organizationally risky for the
critic. 75
Finally, incumbents remained in power not only because of the
inherent advantages of incumbency, 76 but also because they controlled the electoral machinery.7 7 It is difficult to imagine a system
more inimicable to union democracy.
More than any other part of the LMRDA, title IV 78 (the
election provisions) reflects a congressional determination to thwart
the all-powerful entrenched incumbents and to encourage responsive leadership. 79 Thus, section 401(a) 80 requires the union to elect
its officers at five-year intervals in order "to compel rotation in office
thereby enabling the membership to get rid of an undesirable incumbent officer and replace him with one whom they prefer." s
Section 401(c) 82 provides every bona fide candidate with equal access to the union membership lists for the distribution of campaign
materials and guarantees equal treatment of candidates in other
areas as well, thereby "correct[ing] the conditions, so prevalent in
75 M. Esrx, supra note 60, at 53 (footnote omitted). See also note 205 infra
& accompanying text.
76 Such advantages include frequent opportunity to contact members, control of
the union newspaper, access to union counsel, and creation of an administrative
bureaucracy giving incumbents both significant patronage power and an active campaign staff. See generally James, supra note 5, at 270-81; Summers, supra note 63,
at 293; Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse,
81 YALE L.J. 407, 460-68 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Thirteen Years of Use].
77 See Summers, judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YAI.E L.J. 1221,
1228-29 (1961).
78 LMRDA, §§ 401-403, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1976).
79 Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona criticized the original Kennedy-Ervin
bill because,
as introduced, [it] contained no provisions guaranteeing equal treatment of
bona fide candidates for union office, thus leaving every advantage in the
hands of the incumbent union officers. Thus, it would have done nothing
to correct the conditions, so prevalent in many unions, which permit the
incumbent officers to perpetuate themselves in office indefinitely.
105 CONG. REC. 19,764 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in II LExcs.
HisT., supra note 9, at 1843, 1850, also reprinted in Goldwater, The Legislative
History and Purposes of LMRDA, in Sv-NoosIum ox LMRDA 32, 51 (R. Slovenko
ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Goldwater, Legislative History]. To help change
these conditions, the bill was amended to include a provision giving all candidates
the opportunity to use "membership lists for transmitting campaign literature as well
as the requirement permitting all candidates to have observers at both the casting
and counting of the ballots." Id. (These requirements are contained in § 401(c)
of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1976).)
80 LMRDA, § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. §481(a) (1976).
EC. 19,763 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in
81 105 CONG.
TT LEGis. HiS., supra note 9, at 1843, 1849, also reprinted in Goldwater, Legislative
History, supra note 79, at 50.
82 LMBDA, §401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1976).
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many unions, which permit the incumbent officers to perpetuate
themselves in office indefinitely." 83 Section 401(e) 84 establishes the
right of any union member to run for and hold office, subject to
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed. This provision was
designed to ensure a candidate pool large enough to take on the
entrenched incumbency.8 5
Section 4 01(g) 86 goes further. Like its companion provisions,
it was designed to equalize the inherently imbalanced campaign of
the typical union election. By cutting off two of the most lucrative
sources of incumbent funding-the union coffers themselves and, to
a lesser extent, the pocketbook of a collusive employer-the provision attempts to temper the vast strength of the incumbent. At
the same time, it protects the rank and file from illicit use of their
dues payments 87 and from the corrupting influence of a meddling
employer.8 8
Thus, the provision represents the coalescence of the two
themes which pervade the LMRDA: policing corruption and ensuring responsive leadership. 9 In their interpretation of section
401(g), the courts have forgotten that both these objectives must be
satisfied. This Comment concludes that though section 4 01(g), as
presently interpreted, may succeed in deterring corruption, it has
not helped to loosen the grip of the incumbent over the electoral
process.9 0 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that section
401(g) may actually serve to hinder the challenger more than it
9
restricts the incumbent. 1
88 105 CoNe. BEc. 19,764 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in
s. HMsv., supra note 9, at 1843, 1850, also reprintedin Goldwater, Legislative
History, supra note 79, at 51.
84LMRDA, § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976).
8
5 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968)
(limiting candidates to prior holders of elective office unreasonable). Accord, Local
3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 312 (1977) (provision limiting
eligibility for office to members who attended at least one-half local's meetings for
three years preceding the election unreasonable).
s6 LMRDA, § 401(g), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1976).
87
See, e.g., Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp.
1012, 1023 (D.D.C. 1969).
8
8See, e.g., Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen Local 2, 334 F. Supp. 1369, 1380
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1971).
8
9 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
90 In a recent survey conducted to determine the impact of the LMRDA, over
60% of the union members questioned felt that the LMRDA had not affected their
ability to become a union officer. D. McLAG HLIN, supra note 5, at 61. The survey
also demonstrated that opposition slates are more frequent today than they were
prior to 1959, but that "in the main, the incumbents still continue to win the large
majority of the elections, as they always have." Id. 9-10.
91 [T]he government prohibition against expending union funds in support
of candidates ... seems to hamper the opposition more than the incumbent
II Lm
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III. SECnON 401(g) OF

THE

LMRDA

A. Judicial Interpretations
Until the decision in Marshall v. Local 20, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters92 in 1979, it could be said with certainty that the courts were using section 401(g) for its intended
effect-constraining the power of incumbent candidates. 93 Most
courts were relentless in their application of section 4 01(g) to
strike down the use of union funds or facilities to promote the can4
In Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen Local
didacy of the incumbent.9
administration, which has the national machinery at its disposal ...
In the absence of adequate established channels, the autonomy of locals
or other subdivisions to disburse funds for campaign purposes (perhaps up
to a certain limit) may be a lesser evil.
J.D. EDEsTEwn, supra note 13, at 333. See J. BELLAcE, supra note 5, at 189
("[Tihe practical effect of a ban on outside support is the strengthening of the
campaign position of the incumbents."); notes 134-35 infra & accompanying text.
92 101 L.R.R.M. 2195 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).
93 See, e.g., Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp.
1012, 1023 (D.D.C. 1969).
94
See, e.g., Usery v. Stove Workers Int'l Union, 547 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir.
1977); Usery v. International Org. of Masters, 538 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1976);
Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen Local 2, 444 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1971); Shultz v.
Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds sub noa. Hodgson v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971);
Brennan v. Local 300, Laborers Int'l Union, 85 L.R.R.M. 2648 (C.D. Cal. 1974);
Brennan v. Sindicato Empleados de Equipo Pesado, 370 F. Supp. 872 (D.P.R.
1974); Hodgson v. UMW, 344 F. Supp. 17 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
Occasionally, claimed union contributions have withstood challenge under
§ 401(g). See, e.g., New Watch-Dog Comm. v. New York City Taxi Drivers Local
3036, 438 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (single questionable issue of union
newspaper failed to establish substantial past violation or likelihood of repetition
needed for issuing preliminary injunction); Cefalo v. District 50, UMW, 311 F.
Supp. 946, 954-55 (D.D.C. 1970) (claim that incumbent arranged trips by union
officials to promote his candidacy dismissed for insufficent evidence); Shultz v.
Local 1299, United Steelworkers, 324 F. Supp. 750, 758 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd
in part on other grounds and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Hodgson v.
Local 1299, United Steelworkers, 453 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1971) (despite "serious
reservations" about incumbents' use of union newspaper, single publication "did not
amount to 'propoganda organ"' advancing candidacy of incumbents).
Other than Local 20, the few attempts to raise the issue of employer funding
of incumbents have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., McBride v. Rockefeller Family
Fund, 612 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. March
31, 1980) (no private right of action against employers allegedly violating § 401(g));
Usery v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977) (although employer assistance to incumbents
"was undoubtedly violative of Title IV," Secretary of Labor rationally concluded it
did not affect outcome of election); Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen Local 2, 334
F. Supp. 1369, 1378-79 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1971) (statements made by employer on election day did not promote incumbents' candidacy).
A complete synopsis of §401(g) complaints and litigation can be found in
annual reports on the LMRDA by the Labor-Management Services Administration.
E.g., U.S. LABon-MANAGEmENT SERwicEs ADnM STRATON, DEP'T or LAaol, ComIxAN E, ENFoc cEM NT AiD RPoRnNG 3w 1975 (1975). See also U.S. Os-rcx oF
LABoR-MAAwr;EmENT Poicy DEVmELoFmT, DEP'T OF LAB R, UNION ErExcnoN
E LABoR-MANAGEmENT REPonaTmNG AD DIscLosuRE AcT 1966-1970
CAsEs UNDE R

(1972).
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2, 95 for example, the Secretary of Labor sued the union, alleging
that union moneys had been spent to promote the candidacy of
the incumbent, who had won by a narrow margin. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court and held that the union expense
of over $2,000 violated section 4 01(g), "which is absolute and unequivocal in its prohibition against the use of any Union funds for
such a purpose." 96
97
The court in Shultz v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers
favored an even more exacting approach. In holding that the
International's expenditure of $13.04 to promote the campaign of
one candidate was a violation of section 4 01(g), the court insisted
that the provision must be taken at face value:
The legislative history of the Act does not indicate
that Congress intended to place a limit on the amount that
a union might lawfully spend to aid a candidate for office
or that it meant to encourage troublesome factual disputes
over how much (or little) money constitutes a "de minimus" amount; and the language of the provision itself is
clear and unambiguous. It provides in terms that "no
moneys" of a union shall be spent to promote the candidacy of any person for union office. 98
In dicta, the court went even further. Acknowledging "that the
object of the section is to prohibit discrimination between candidates," 99 the court nonetheless insisted that even if the union were
to contribute equally to all candidates, a violation of section 4 01(g)
would be found. 0 0 The court reasoned that because the statute
does delineate lawful-as well as unlawful-union expenditures, 101
the failure of Congress to list "equal" campaign contributions as a
0 2
lawful activity must make such contributions unlawful.
95 344 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1971).

96 444 F.2d at 1350.
97426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Hodgson v.
Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
98 Id. 972.

99Id.
100 Id. See Camarata v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 102 L.R.R.M. 3053,
3061 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1979) (enjoining union to include insurgents' literature in
union newspaper on the basis of equal space and prominence would violate § 401(g)
and first amendment).
101 The last sentence of § 401(g) reads: "Such moneys of a labor organization
may be utilized for notices, factual statements of issues not involving candidates,
and other expenses necessary for the holding of an election." LMRDA, § 401(g),
29 U.S.C. §481(g) (1976).
102 426 F.2d at 972.
But see Yablonski v. UMW, 305 F. Supp. 876, 877
(D.D.C. 1969) (supplementing 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1969)) (union could
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Judicial insistence on strict application of section 401(g) has
not been limited to cases of abuse by incumbents. The provision
has been applied to limit the challenger as well. For example, in
Loekle v. Swayduck,103 the plaintiff, a union member for over 20
years, decided to challenge the long-entrenched leadership. He
wanted to give a campaign speech at a shop meeting, and sued the
union, asking the court to enjoin the enforcement of union rules
forbidding such campaigning104 Because campaign speeches by
incumbents at union halls had previously been held to violate
section 401(g), 0 5 the court refused to enjoin enforcement of the
rules, noting that "[a]Ithough § 4 01(g) of the Act was originally
enacted in light of evidence incumbents had used union funds to
promote their candidacy, the language makes it clear that this prohibition is also applicable to non-incumbents." 106 In Marshall v.
Local 20, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, the Sixth Circuit
used similar logic to strike down the challenger's use of employer
moneys, citing Shultz v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers to justify
07
its rationale.
The courts' strict construction of section 401 (g) was proper
when the target of their opprobrium was the incumbent. Such an
approach to incumbent funding did not conflict with the dual
legislative purpose of the provision-deterring corruption and promoting union democracy. 0 8 Further, a broad formulation dispensed with the subtleties of line drawing and appeared easy to
administer. 09
The problems inherent in section 401(g) began to emerge only
when the provision was applied to the challenger in a union election. Suddenly, it seemed impossible to satisfy one purpose underdevote space in its newspaper to views of candidates, so long as the airing of views
was on a nondiscriminatory basis); Jenkins, Trade Union Elections in REGuLrATNG
UNroN Gov tnmirr 54, 172 (M. Estey, P. Taft & M. Wagner eds. 1964) (although
equal space devoted to candidate views is technically use of union funds, there is no
violation of § 401(g)); note 201 infra. See generally J. BELLACE, supra note 5, at
185-87; Summers, supra note 63, at 294.
103 94 L.R.R.M. 2442 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
104 Id. 2448.
105 Id. 2448-49 (citing Brennan v. Sindicato Empleados de Equipo Pesado,
370 F. Supp. 872, 879 (D.P.R. 1974)).
106 94 L.R.R.M. at 2449.
107

611 F.2d at 651-52 (citing 426 F.2d at 972).

08

2 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
109 See Local 20, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2197; Secretary's Brief, supra note 31,
at 16-17.
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lying the section without sacrificing the other. 10 As this Comment
will demonstrate, this dilemma is rooted in the statute itself. Section
401(g) is simply not designed well.-" But the courts-faced with a
poorly conceived provision-have only exacerbated the problem.
Convinced that corruption is the main evil to be addressed by the
provision, the courts have invariably concluded that section 4 01(g)
applies equally to both challengers and incumbents. In so doing,
they have pushed aside the other critical function of the section: to
ensure responsive union leadership by encouraging effective challenges to the entrenched incumbents.
B. Why Has Section 4 01(g) Failed?
The anomalous result described above is possible because the
legislators who drafted section 401(g)-and the courts which have
interpreted it-have failed to account for the electoral power of the
union staff. Unions, after all, are vast bureaucracies," x2 often employing hundreds "3 of paid workers simply to oil and run the
union machinery. These staff members, often dependent on the
incumbent administration for their jobs,"x4 willingly provide the
incumbent with free public relations," 5 legal advice," 6 and other
services."17 Their mere presence among the rank and file "provides
a network of free and well distributed campaigners." 11 And, of
course, they contribute money. In the 1977 Steelworkers election,
for example, Lloyd McBride, the administration-backed candidate,
received a reported $182,000 in contributions "9 while insurgent
110 Judge Phillip's opinion in Marshall v. Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
focused solely on congressional concern with corruption and influence-buying. It
failed to mention, even in passing, the second congressional policy in favor of
responsiveness of union officials.

MnSee notes 134-46 infra & accompanying text.
For an extreme example, see J. BAnBASH, supra note 70, at 88 (listing 51
staff departments of the United Auto Workers Union).
113 See, e.g., James, supra note 5, at 277.
114 See generally J. BAE3ASH, supra note 70, at 99 ("Dismissal was the likely
price of neutrality or of aiding the unsuccessful candidate-a situation which has
not been changed by LMRDA."); James, supra note 5, at 277.
112

115 James, supra note 5, at 277.
116 Id. 280-81.
117

Id. 277.

118 Id.
"

9 Ignatius, USW's McBride to Offer Analysis of Gift Data Today, Wall St.

J., Jan. 21, 1977, at 10, col. 5.
The 1969 Mineworkers election reflected a similar pattern. The incumbents'
re-election campaign was financed in part through contributions to the Miners,
Committee for Boyle, Titler, Owens (the incumbent slate). The Committee received $142,710 from 229 persons, "virtually all of whom were on the union
payroll." Hodgson v. UMW, 344 F. Supp. 17, 24 (D.D.C. 1972).

UNION CAMPAIGNS

Edward Sadlowski collected $153,000.1 20 The significant distinction
between the two candidates' campaign finances, however, was in the
percentage of contributions from union staffers. At least eighty-six
percent of McBride's contributions came from paid union staffers, 121
while more than half of Sadlowski's support came from outside the
22

union.1

The power which the incumbent can wield over his staffers
has been graphically illustrated in the case law. In Hodgson v.
UMW,

23

the Secretary of Labor brought suit alleging violations of

section 401(g) 124 in the 1969 Mineworkers election between W.A.
"Tony" Boyle and Joseph A. Yablonski.125 The court found that
the union administration had "timed and manipulated" staff salary
increases to coincide with the election "in an effort to attract the
support of its employees for the incumbent officers in terms of
services and financial aid." 126 Outright coercion was applied as
well. One temporary union staffer testified that the district president, his employer, "made it clear that his continued status on the
District's payroll was contingent upon his willingness to contribute
his so-called fair share of $175." 127
A similar story was recounted in Brennan v. United Steelworkers. 28 In that case, Steelworkers Union president I.W. Abel
is quoted as admitting that he "assume[d]" that district directors
and their staff would contribute up to $500 each to support the
administration-backed candidate in an election for district director.12
Judge Van Dusen noted: "The facts of this case illustrate graph120 1gnatius, supra note 119.

Id.
Id. One source reported that only 5.4% of Sadlowski's support came from
the union rank and file. Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1977, at 12, col. 2. See generally
121
12

James, supra note 5, at 348-49.
1-23344 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1972).
124 See note 27 supra.
125Boyle won with 80,577 votes to 46,076 for Yablonski; less than a month
later Yablonski and his family were murdered at Boyle's direction. See generally
United Mine Workers' Election: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the

Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (pt. 1), & 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 2) (1970-71); J. Fmry, THE CORRUPT KmcrOM 255-79
(1972); Rauh, LMRDA-Enforce It or Repeal It, 5 GA. L. REv. 643 (1971);
Fair Election Procedures Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 and the United Mine Workers, 6 COLum. J.L. & Soc. ThoB. 76 (1971).
126 344 F. Supp. at 25.
127Id. Furthermore, the president "conceded that he expected all paid employees in his District to contribtute . . . and that he had made them aware of his

expectations." Id.
128554 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977).
129 Id. 602 n.9a; see id. 603 n.9b (official fuindraising arm of the Steelworkers
sought $500 per director and $50 per staff member for district directors campaign).
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ically the abuses of power which the LMRDA was enacted to prevent. The Union hierarchy, rather than remaining neutral and
maintaining the integrity of the electoral process, closed ranks
around its own candidate to prevent an independent contender from
gaining a foothold."

130

The most blatant forms of staff coercion, of course, are easily
snared by section 4 0 1(g).1 81 But even a campaign contribution
made free of explicit pressure can be tainted by more subtle influences, real or perceived. The Supreme Court recognized this
problem in the public arena almost a century ago when it ruled in
Ex parte Curtis 132 that a precursor of the Hatch Act was not un-

constitutional:
If contributions from those in public employment may be
solicited by others in official authority, it is easy to see that
what begins as a request may end as a demand . . .
.

Contributions secured under such circumstances will quite
as likely be made to avoid the consequences of the personal
displeasure of a superior, as to promote the political views
of the contributor,-to avoid a discharge from service, not
to exercise a political privilege. 133
As presently interpreted, the LMRDA makes no allowance for
this inevitable-and dangerous-result. 13 Thus, section 401(g) now
actually works to help the incumbent candidate by shutting off
access to union and employer funds for all candidates. This construction denies financial aid to the rank-and-file challenger while
130 Id.608.
131 See, e.g., notes 126 & 127 supra & accompanying
132106 U.S. 371 (1882).
133Id. 374. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n

text.
v. National Ass'n of Letter

Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 566-67 (1973) (prohibition of political activity needed to
prevent coercion by superiors); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
96-99 (1947) (prohibition of political activity promotes efficiency in public

service by preventing promotion of personnel as a result of political, rather than
official effort); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398-99 (1930)

(pro-

hibition of contributions from public service employees to congressmen is constitutional).
134 The Department of Labor's regulations provide:
Unless restricted by constitutional provisions to the contrary, union
officers and employes [sic] retain their rights as members to participate in
the affairs of the union, including campaigning activities on behalf of
either faction in an election.

However, such campaigning must not

involve the expenditure of funds in violation of section 401(g). Accordingly, officers and employees may not campaign on time that is paid for
by the union, nor use union funds, facilities, equipment, stationery, etc.,
to assist them in such campaigning. Campaignitig incidental to regular
union business would not be a violation.
29 C.F.R. §452.76 (1979) (emphasis added).

1115

UNION CAMPAIGNS

leaving the union staffers free to contribute large sums to their
employer, the incumbent. 13 5
This approach might not have deleterious consequences in a
strong two-party system where supporters would funnel their contributions through organized party channels. Candidates-elite
members of their respective parties ' 3 0-would enter the campaign
with a strong power base and significant financial support.137 The
natural advantages of incumbency 1s would remain, of course, but
would be tempered by the presence of a permanent, organized
opposition party.139 This structure, very similar to that of American public government, 14 0 may have been the democratic model
which Congress envisioned when it enacted the LMRDA.141
Union politics, however, has rarely been structured along twoparty lines.'4 In most unions, the incumbent or administrationbacked candidate will run unopposed or face a challenger with few
resources at his disposal. 143 In such a structure, the claim that "an
incumbent always has the advantage in an election"

144

is a monu-

mental understatement. The incumbent has more than "the advantage"; he holds the ticket to self-perpetuating autocracy. Unless
the campaign financing provisions of the LMRDA are construedor rewritten 145-with full cognizance of this imbalance, the objectives of the statute will continue to be thwarted. 146
1

35

See note 91 supra & accompanying text.

336See

C.W.

MmLS,

Ta

Powm Eixr

(1956).

137 In addition, these candidates would have well-honed administrative and

leadership skills. See S. LuPsET, supra note 23, at 260-64.
138 See note 76 supra.
139 See S. LnpSET, supra note 23, at 276-77. Cf. note 73 supra & accompanying
text (two-party system is rare in unions).
14oFor a classic study of the structure of American government, see A. nF.
TocQuEVLL , DEmoOcBCY 3x AmErucA (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
141 See notes 21-24 supra & accompanying text.
142 See note 23 supra; Kahm-Freund, supra note 60, at 263-64.
143 See, e.g., M. Es-rm, supra note 60, at 50.
'44 Marshall v. Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 101 L.R.B.M. 2195, 2197
(N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).
145 See -also Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry Into Title IV of the
LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U. L. BEv. 336, 348-50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Election
Labyrinth]. That Note concludes:
Because of the uncertain relationship between [§§501(a), 503(a),

and 401(g)] .

.

. and the attendant opportunities for circumvention, it it

[sic] doubtful that these provisions have effectively precluded use of
union funds to promote the candidacy of incumbent leaders. In recognition of the reality that campaigns cost money it would, perhaps, be better
to draft a single coherent scheme which would restrict, without purporting
to prohibit, use of union funds and facilities for these purposes.

Id. 350.

146 It should also be noted that the discriminatory effect of § 401(g) may open
the provision to attack on equal protection grounds. Although it is beyond the
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EQUALIZING INCUMBENT AND CHALLENGER:

THE

ALTERNATIVES

A. ReinterpretingSection 4 0 1(g)
The defendant union in Marshall v. Local 20, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters 147 was well aware of the fact that a broad
interpretation of the phrase "moneys of an employer" would, in
effect, incapacitate non-elite challengers who, unlike their incumbent opponents, could turn nowhere else for necessary monetary
support. Thus, the union, under the control of the victorious
challenger, argued that "employer" should be more narrowly construed to encompass only "interested employers"-such as those
employers with a direct bargaining or vending relationship with
the union.1 48
In support of its contention, the union referred the court to
section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, 149 which prohibits an "interested
employer or employer association" from financing, encouraging, or
scope of this Comment to engage in extensive equal protection analysis, a brief
discussion would be appropriate. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the
landmark case which explored the constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1976), the Court upheld the constitutionality of contribution limitations in the public forum. The Court rejected
the contention that these limitations "work such an invidious discrimination between
incumbents and challengers that the statutory provisions must be declared unconstitutional on their face." Id. 30-31. It did, however, leave open the possibility
that invidious discrimination against the challenger could be found under other
circumstances. In a lengthy footnote, the Court cautioned that contribution limitations, coupled with expenditure limitations, might "invidiously discriminate against
major-party challengers and minor-party candidates." Id. 31 n.33. The Court
continued:
Since an incumbent is subject to these limitations to the same degree
as his opponent, the Act, on its face, appears to be evenhanded. The
appearance of fairness, however, may not reflect political reality. Although
some incumbents are defeated in every congressional election, it is
axiomatic that an incumbent usually begins the race with significant
Where the incumbent has the support of major specialadvantages....
interest groups . . . and is further supported by the media, the overall
effect of the contribution and expenditure limitations enacted by Congress
could foreclose any fair opportunity of a successful challenge.
Id. The Court never reached this issue, however, because it decided that the
expenditure limitations were unconstitutional under the first amendment. Id. 39-59.
If the Court's footnote is read narrowly to the effect that a facially nondiscriminatory campaign financing provision will withstand equal protection scrutiny
unless it limits both contributions and expenditures, § 401(g) appears constitutional.
But such a narrow reading is illogical. The Court had already declared the
campaign-expenditure limitations unconstitutional on first amendment grounds. The
footnote would thus be superfluous unless it is read more generally to suggest that,
under some circumstances, a facially nondiscriminatory provision might violate the
equal protection clause. Under such a reading, § 401(g) is problematic.
147 101 L.R.R.M. 2195 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).
148 See 611 F.2d at 650.
14929 U.S.C. §411(a)(4) (1976).
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participating in suits by union members against their union or its
officers.' 5 0 The addition of the word "interested" to this proviso
was explained in the legislative history: some congressmen feared
that without it, union members would be unable to obtain funds
from their friends, from banks, or from similar sources. 151 The
union argued that the same rationale should apply to section 4 01(g);
heeding Professor Cox's admonition, 152 the union proposed that the
word "interested" be read into the provision. 53
The Sixth Circuit declined to accept this suggestion. Instead,
it asserted that "[t]he careful consideration given to the precise
wording of § 101(a)(4) .

.

. in its use of the term 'interested em-

ployer' shows that Congress deliberately decided not to distinguish
between interested and disinterested employers in [section 4 01(g)]
"

154

This position is untenable.6 5 The court misconstrued the
legislative history of section 401(g) to produce a result which, if
followed to its logical conclusion, is facially absurd. 153 Further, by
attempting to draw a line which would be easy to apply, the court
created a host of new problems, thus confounding that purpose. 52
Finally, a literal construction of "employer" would contradict the
usually flexible judicial interpretation of the LMRDA. 5 s
The reason for the broad statutory definition of "employer" '159
is unrelated to Congress's concern with elections; the definition was
designed in conjunction with the LMRDA's management reporting
provisions."' There is no indication in the legislative history that
disinterested employers were disrupting the election process. On
the contrary, in Congress's eyes, those employers who engaged in
150 Id.

See notes 179-89 infra & accompanying text.
15' See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 6725 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted
in II LEGIs. HIST., supra note 9, at 1237; 105 CONG. REc. 19,758 (1959) (remarks
of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in II LxEGs. HIST., supra note 9, at 1843, 1844, also
reprinted in Goldwater, Legislative History, supra note 79, at 35.
167 infra.
52
'
See text accompanying note 46 supra.

See also note

153 See 611 F.2d at 652.

154Id. (footnote omitted).
55
'
The court's view on the "interested employer" issue was also not necessary
in order to reach the result of Local 20. See note 31 supra.
156 See notes 171-74 infra & accompanying text.
157 See notes 175-78 infra & accompanying text.

158 See notes 190-98 infra & accompanying text
159 LMRDA, § 3(e), 29 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976).
160 See Rezler, The Definitions of LMRDA, in SYasposrum oN LMRDA 263,
264 (I. Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Rezler, Definitions].

1118

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 128:1094

collusion with unions were quite "interested." 161 As the district
court in Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen Local 2 162 stated: "Employers
were included [in section 401(g)] because, as the hearings before the
Congress disclosed, 'They (some employers) have cooperated with
and even aided crooks and racketeers in the labor movement at the
expense of their own employees . . .'."113
Further, the argument that inclusion of the qualifier "interested" in section 101(a)(4) implies exclusion of that same limitation
from section 401(g) is refuted by careful examination of title IV's
history.1 4 Section 4 01(g) was a nonpartisan, noncontroversial provision which first passed the Senate over one year prior to enactment
of the LMRDA. 16 5 Section 101(a)(4), in contrast, was part of a later,
161 See McCr LErLLA
Commst. REP., supra note 2, at 4-5. This report lists six
ways in which management colluded with unions:
(a) They have paid high union officials to obtain favored treatment
by way of "sweetheart" contracts.
(b) They have paid off to obtain inferior contracts which impose
substandard working conditions on thousands of workers.
(c) They have connived with "approved" unions at under-the-table
agreements to permit organizing of their workers to the exclusion of other

unions.

(d) Certain companies have granted business concessions and loans
to union leaders with whom they want to curry favor.
(e) Trade associations have conspired with unions to achieve industry
monopolies.
(f) So called "whip companies" have been set up to keep rival companies in line, and have been blinked at by unions even when they have
themselves broken union rules.
Id.
F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1971).
163 Id. 1380 (quoting SENATE LABoR CozNa. REP., supra note 9, at 6, reprinted
in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2318, 2336, also reprinted in I LEGis. Hsr.,
supra note 9, at 402) (emphasis added) (court's omission). The Sixth Circuit in
Marshall v. Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters quoted this passage with approval in
its first amendment discussion. 611 F.2d at 653.
164 See generally Rezler, Elections, supra note 1, at 489-94.
165 Section 401(g) was originally part of the Kennedy-Ives bill, S. 3974, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CoNG. REc. 18,260-66 (1958). The Kennedy-Ives bill passed
the Senate by a vote of 88-1, 104 CoNG. REc. 11,486-87 (1958), but died in the
House in an election year. See, e.g., J. BELLAcE, supra note 5, at 4-5; Levitan,
supra note 47, at 42-45. Although parts of the bill, like parts of the LMRDA,
generated controversy on the Senate floor, the Senate did not discuss the precursor
of § 401(g). (The Senate floor debate took place from June 12-17, 1958, and is
interspersed throughout 104 CONG. REc. 10,943-11,487 (1958).)
In the next Congress, rival bills were introduced in the House as substitutes
for the Kennedy-Ervin bill already enacted by the Senate. Insofar as these bills
mentioned contributions to union elections, they were identical to § 401(g). E.g.,
H.R. 8342, § 401(f), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (Elliot bill), reprintedin I LECIs.
HisT., supra note 9, at 687, 726; H.R. 8400, § 401(f), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)
(Landrum-Grilfin bill), reprinted in I LEGIS. HIST., supra note 9, at 619, 656; H.R.
8490, § 401(f), 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (Shelley bill), reprinted in I LEIMS.
HIST., supra note 9, at 865, 906. See also S. 748, § 303(a) (1), 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959) (administration bill), reprinted in I LEGis. HIST., supra note 9, at 84,
113-14.
162 334
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controversial amendment to the Act. 166 Thus, the presence of the
word "interested" in section 101(a)(4) 111 can hardly shed any light
on the congressional intent with respect to the earlier section. The
most likely explanation of the difference between sections 101(a)(4)
and 4 01(g) is simply that title IV was overlooked 168 in the controversy surrounding titles I and VII over which most of the legislative
battles were fought. 16 9
A continued mechanical reading of "employer" will lead to an
absurd result-some union members might be barred from making
contributions in union elections. 170 Section 3(e) of the LMRDA
defines "employer" to include anyone in "an industry affecting com166 After the Senate bill was reported out of committee, title I was introduced
on the Senate floor in "an impassioned two-hour speech" by Senator McClellan.
J. BELLACE, supra note 5, at 6; see 105 CONG. REc. 6469-80 (1959), reprinted in
H LEcis.
HIsT., supra note 9, at 1096-1108.
6 7
'
The interested-employer proviso was not part of Senator McClellan's proposal; it was added in a subsequent floor amendment to the bill. See 105 CONG.
BEc. 6724-27 (1958), reprinted in II LEGis. HIsT., supra note 9, at 1236-39. See
generally, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 19,758 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in H LEeis. HisT., supra note 9, at 1843, 1844, also reprinted in Goldwater,
Legislative History, supra note 79, at 35; Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill
of Rights" for Union Members, 45 Mr,\w. L. REv. 199, 213-16 (1960).
168 Even when title IV was discussed, congressmen and commentators alike
frequently overlooked the prohibition against employer, as opposed to union, contributions in § 401(g) or identical provisions of other bills. See, e.g., SENATE
LABoR Comm. REP., supra note 9, at 4, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2318, 2320, also reprinted in I LEGis. HIST., supra note 9, at 400; H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin t1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 2424, 2426, also reprinted in I LEGis. HIST., supra note 9, at 759, 761; 105
CoNG. EEc. 885 (1959) (remarks of Sen. J. Kennedy), reprinted in H LEGs. HsT.,
supra note 9, at 969; 105 CoNG. BEc. 1450 (1959) (remarks of Rep. J. Roosevelt),
reprinted in II LEGs. IST., supra note 9, at 1464; 105 CoNG. Ec. 6741 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. Mundt), reprinted in II LEGis. I-hsT., supra note 9, at 1253-54;
105 CONG. Ec. 15,021 (1959) (remarks of Rep. J. O'Hara), reprinted in II LEGrs.
Hrsr., supra note 9, at 1535; 105 CONG. BEc. 15,549 (1959) (explanation by Rep.
Elliot; quoted in remarks of Rep. Bolling), reprinted in II LEGIs. HIsT., supra note
9, at 1585; 104 CONG. EeC. 11,481 (1958) (statement of Sen. McClellan, quoted in
remarks by Sen. Johnson); Cox, supra note 4, at 844; Daniels, Union Elections and
the Landrum-Grifin Act, 13 N.Y.U. Co-m'. LAB. 317, 318-24 (1960); Lipset, supra
note 24, at 24 (1961); Summers, supra note 63, at 294; Note, The Election
Labyrinth, supra note 145, at 348-50; Comment, Union Corruption, supra note 1,
at 486; Note, The Kennedy-Ives Bill: An Analysis of Suggested Labor Legislation,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 692 (1959).
169 Title I passed by a vote of 47-46, and escaped reconsideration by a vote
of 46-45, with Vice President Nixon casting the tie-breaker. 105 CONG. Ec. 6492
(1959), reprintedin ]a LEGis. HrsT., supra note 9, at 1119. See J.BEL.ACE, supra
note 5, at 6; Griffin, supra note 64, at 28; Murphy, The Background of the Bill of
Rights and Its Provisions, in Symnosru , supra note 1, at 277, 281-83.
Title VH contained controversial amendments to the secondary-boycott provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, and much of the debate on the LMRDA
"raged" around these changes. Griffin, supra note 64, at 27. See J. BEL.ACE,
supra note 5, at 5, 7.
Title IV, however, was enacted with comparatively little debate or amendment
See, e.g., J.BELLACE, supra note 5, at 7; Rezler, Elections, supra note 1, at 491-92.
170 Note that inferring the qualifier "interested" into § 401(g)'s proscription
of employer contributions does not solve the problem of the union-member employer
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merce" who is an employer "within the meaning of any law . .
relating to the employment of any employees." 171 This definition
obviously includes a union member who operates a small business
on the side. If broad enough interpretations are given to "industry
affecting commerce" 172 and "any law," 173 the term "employer"
would encompass union members who employed a nurse, maid, or
even a babysitter. 174 Of course, the courts would not adhere to the
mechanical reading of "employer" described above. Sooner or later
they must grapple with both of the LMRDA's underlying rationales;
the purposes of the Act are best effectuated by applying its policies
sooner.
It is, however, tempting to avoid these policy issues. By refusing to read "interested" into section 4 01(g), the courts may believe
they have devised a test capable of easy application. 175 In one sense,
an all-inclusive definition of the term "employer" is quite efficientit does save the time necessary to define the term "interested."
But this is false economy; such a definition creates new problems
without really avoiding the old one. A new series of questions
emerges: Are donations of legal services from disinterested employers to candidates barred by section 401(g) or saved by section
If the former, does section 4 0 1(g) violate the first
101(a)(4)? '
amendment? 177 And, in a different vein, is nondiscriminatory
publicity by an employer illegal? 17s
-by any reasonable definition he will be "interested." See notes 179-89 infra &
accompanying text.
17129 U.S.C. §402(e) (1976) (emphasis added). See generally Rezier,
Definitions, supra note 160, at 264-65.
-72 See, e.g., Rezler, Definitions, supra note 160, at 265.
173 See, e.g., I.R.C. §3306(a) (withholding statute); 29 U.S.C. §203(d)
(1976)7 4 (Fair Labor Standards Act).
'
See Rauh, supra note 6.
175 Local 20, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2197.
17G See UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation,
Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1978), aff'g 433 F. Supp. 474 (D.D.C. 1977)
(§ 104(a) (4) does not prohibit legal services from bona fide legal-aid organization).
In McBride v. Rockefeller Family Fund, 101 L.R.R.M. 2576 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 612
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. March 31, 1980),
the Steelworkers claimed that free legal services constituted illegal employer contributions. Complaint at 9-10. The case was decided against the union on jurisdictional grounds, but the complaint demonstrates that the question posed in the text
is not hypothetical.
177 In UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation,
Inc., the district court held that § 101(a) (4) contained such a prohibition and
therefore violated the first amendment. 433 F. Supp. at 482. The District of
Columbia Circuit, partly to avoid the constitutional question, 590 F.2d at 1147-48,
held that § 101(a) (4) "does not apply to legitimate activity of a bona fide, independent legal organization." Id. 1150.
178 Nondiscriminatory publicity by a union is legal, even though one-sided
publicity is a contribution. See note 201 infra. It is difficult to justify construing
employer publicity differently.
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The old problem-defining "interested"-remains, because the
courts nonetheless must reach this issue in the context of section
101(a) (4). The cases construing this section demonstrate that it is
possible to devise a manageable definition of "interested employer." 179 Under section 101(a)(4), an employer's "interest" has
been held to stem from his relationship with the union, 180 or from
his stake in the litigation. 181 In Adamszewski v. Local 1487, International Association of Machinists, 8 2 the employer was held to be
"interested" because "any divisiveness within the union [caused by
the suit]

.

.

. could weaken it at the bargaining table where it

would be unable to present a solid front." 183 Adamszewski also
held that an employer who was "liable to be affected by" the litigation was "interested." 184 On the other hand, an independent legalaid organization having no relationship to the union was not
"interested," even though the organization received contributions
from interested employers. 8 5
These interpretations are certainly adaptable to section
401(g). 186 An employer may contribute to a campaign unless he is
in an actual or potential bargaining relationship with the union, or
179 See Harris v. Plasterers Local 406, 103 L.R.R.M. 2884 (7th Cir. March 10,
1980); UAW v. National Bight to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, Inc.,
590 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Adamszewski v. Local 1487, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 496 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); Farowitz
v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally J. BET.AcE, supra note 5, at 63-66; see also IBEW Local 336 v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 496 F.2d 1, 3-4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (interested
employer may finance employee's defense or counterclaim); UAW v. Oshkosh Truck
Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. 2866 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (complaint states claim on which relief
under § 101(a)(4) can be granted).
180 See Harris, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2887 (quoting Adamszewskci, 496 F.2d at 783).
181 See Harris, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2887 (quoting Adamszewski, 496 F.2d at 784);
J. B_ TAcE, supra note 5, at 64.
182 496 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
183 Id. 784.
An early case, Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), held that employers in a sporadic collective bargaining relationship
were not "interested" because of their small, indirect interest, where what was at
stake for the plaintiff was "his career and livelihood." Id. 908. While Adnmszewski
distinguished Farowitz, the Adamszewski court also said that the Farowitz reading
of the purposes of § 101(a) (4) was too narrow. 496 F.2d at 782. Thus, the
Farowitz result now appears to be appropriately rejected.
184 496 F.2d at 784.
185 UAW v. National Bight to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, Inc.,
590 F.2d 1139, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
186 The §101(a)(4) interpretations are not facially inconsistent with the
language of the Department of Labor regulation: "The prohibition [of § 401(g)]
...is not restricted to employers who employ members of the labor organization
... or who have any business or contractual relationship with the labor organization." 29 C.F.R. § 452.78(b) (1979). The definition in the text is sufficiently
broad and therefore contains no such restriction.
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unless "the factual context" 187 shows that the employer could potentially realize "legal, financial or business advantage" 1s8 from the
election. Thus, any business or bargaining relationship, either
actual or potential, would be sufficient to disqualify an employer
from contributing to an internal union election. 8 9
Such a reading of section 401(g) comports with the long history
of judicial flexibility in construing the LMRDA. In Hall v. Cole,' 90
for example, the Supreme Court held that counsel fees should be
awarded to the plaintiff in a section 102 191 suit, even absent explicit
statutory authorization. The defendants in the case argued that
because Congress had expressly authorized fee-shifting in sections
201(c) 192 and 501(b), 9 3 the lack of a similar provision in section 102
"indicates an intent to preclude 'fee-shifting.' " 194 The Court,
citing Professor Cox's advice to the judiciary, 195 rejected this
argument.
The Court followed the same approach in Wirtz v. Local 153,
Glass Bottle Blowers Association,'9" a title IV case. Despite the
statute's clear and unambiguous language, the Court felt compelled to look beyond mere words to the policies underlying the
LMRDA:
[N]o exceptions are admitted by the unambiguous wording .. ..
Nonetheless, this does not end the inquiry. We have
cautioned against a literal reading of congressional labor
legislation; such legislation is often the product of conflict
and compromise between strongly held and opposed views,
and its proper construction frequently requires consideration of its wording against the background of its legislative
history and in the light of the general objectives Congress
197
sought to achieve. . . . The LMRDA is no exception.
1 87

Harris, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2887 (quoting Adamszewski, 496 F.2d at 784).
Adamszewski, 496 F.2d at 784.
189 See James, supra note 5, at 282-83, 291-93. A rule broader than that
proposed by this Comment, yet narrower than the present judicial interpretation,
88

1

would bar contributions from business or corporate entities and their major stockholders. See Rauh, supra note 6.
190 412 U.S. 1 (1973).

191 LMRDA, § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976).
192Id. § 201(c), 29 U.S.C. §431(c) (1976).
'93

Id. § 501 (b), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (b) (1976).

412 U.S. at 10.
195 Id. 11 n.17. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
196 389 U.S. 463 (1968).
19Id. 468 (citing Cox, supra note 4, at 852) (citations and footnote omitted).
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Application of these principles of flexible judicial construction
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the term "employer" must
be construed narrowly. p8 Further, the very structure of section
401(g) demonstrates that the legislators who drafted it were unaware
of the enormous disparities between incumbent and challenger., 99
Congressional incomprehension 20 0 of the setting in which section
4 01(g) operates, however, is no justification for judicial ignorance.2 01
In this connection, it is significant that when Congress did see
financial imbalance, in the section 101(a)(4) suit by the individual
against his union, it carefully delineated an acceptable funding
source for the needy plaintiff-the disinterested employer.
Judicial reinterpretation of section 4 0 1(g) has merit. First,
and most important, the proposal opens a crack in the financing
scheme, enabling the challenger to obtain sufficient funding in a
union election. This will foster one of the LMRDA objectives:
198 See notes 56-77 supra & accompanying text.
199 See text accompanying notes 112-22 supra.
200
Legislative ignorance was spotted early. Shortly after the bill was passed,
one commentator noted:
It is the crippling weakness of the new labor law that, while prescribing
free traffic for dissenting opinion, it does not provide the means for
advancing the views or interests of a dissenting member or group. There
is a drastic disparity between the material and other resources at the
disposal of an officer defending himself-and the union-and the sinews
of war available to the individual member. The authors of LMRDA,
nearly all lawyers, might have given this some thought, but they did not.
Hardman, Labor Courts for Labor Democracy, NEw LEmAEi, Jan. 25, 1960, at 20,
21.
201 For an impressive example of a court sufficiently ambitious to look beyond
legislative ignorance, see Yablonski v. UMV, 305 F. Supp. 876, 877 & n.1 (D.D.C.
1969) (supplementing 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1969)) (union newspaper could
devote equal space to both candidates without violating § 401(g), even though
Congress had not considered that option when the provision was drafted).
NLRB Member Jenkins has also stated that nondiscriminatory coverage of
candidates, though literally in violation of § 401(g), should be deemed legal:
It has become the fashion for many unions having newspapers or other
publications to adopt what has come to be known as a "battle page." The
paper opens its columns to all candidates and permits each or his adherents
to submit copy for publication without revision of content aside from
libel. Others follow the practice of publishing proffles or summaries concerning all candidates, permitting the candidate to approve what is said
about him. Neither of these practices, though technically constituting use
of union funds for statements involving candidates, has been deemed
violative of Section 401(g). This construction is thought to be both
realistic and consistent with the legislative history of the statutory
provision.
Jenkins, supra note 102, at 172.
This approach is now embodied in regulations of the Department of Labor.
These rules expressly authorize expenditure of
29 C.F.R. §§ 452.74-.75 (1979).
union funds for "impartial" election publicity, such as sponsoring debates for all
candidates and distributing biographical data of all candidates. Id. § 452.74. The
only explicitly prohibited use of union newspapers is for a "showing of preference."
Id. § 452.77.
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ensuring responsive leadership. Second, the addition of the word
"interested" will work as a bar against unscrupulous employers
looking for deals and favors. Thus, the second objective of the
LMRDA-preventing corruption-will be satisfied as well.20 2 Third,
the solution is judicially created and can therefore be implemented
20 3
immediately by the courts.

B. Legislative Proposals

In the long run, the judicial authorization of disinterested employer contributions is an unsatisfactory and indirect solution to a
deep-rooted problem. The rule requires close supervision by the
courts, and is concededly more difficult to administer than a flat ban
on all employer funding.204 It boosts the expenditure level of all
candidates-not merely the challenger. Even more important, the
acceptance of outside funding by the challenger provides ammunition for the incumbent, who is eager to paint his adversary as an
agitator, outsider, or traitor.2 0 5 In such a setting, the challenger's
dependence on outside money is, at best, problematic.
A more effective approach to the problems inherent in unionelection financing would aim directly at the source of the trouble202 This objective is also furthered by the reporting and disclosure requirements
located in title II of the LMRDA, §§201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§432-433 (1976), and
by § 302(a)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(4)
(1976), which makes it unlawful, inter alia, for any employer or employer association to give any money or other thing of value "to any officer or employee of a
labor organization . . . with intent to influence him in respect to any of his
actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such officer or
employee of such labor organization." Id.
203One final advantage to this approach is its skirting of the first amendment
issue raised by the defendant union in Marshall v. Local 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters.
See text accompanying note 34 supra and note 41 supra & accompanying text.
A discussion of the relevant constitutional considerations would be inappropriate
here, but the interested reader is urged to compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (holding that a federal limitation on campaign contributions "permits the
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any
way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Id. 21)
with UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Foundation, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 474, 483 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 590 F.2d 1139 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (district court held that interested-employer proviso of § 101(a)(4),
as applied to the foundation, violated the first amendment rights of the foundation
and its contributors).
2 04
See note 109 supra & accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., Sheldon v. O'Callaghan, 335 F. Supp. 325, 326 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (union newsletter referred to opposition as "flunkies, character assassins,
racists and finks who pollute the waterfront with propaganda against the leadership
. . . with mindless, poison pen, libelous anti-labor trash. .. . Groups and cliques
who spread the garbage suck the curdled milk from the mother wolf who inspires
the wolf-pack."). See generally J. BARBAsH, supra note 70, at 131; James, supra
note 5, at 281-82; text accompanying note 75 supra.
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the union staff.2°6 This Comment has demonstrated that the union
staff is a powerful force in engineering the re-election of the incumbent. 0 7 New legislation, patterned after the Hatch Act,2 8
could go far in correcting this imbalance.20 9 The Hatch Act forbids
federal government employees from giving or receiving any "thing
of value for political purposes," 210 and prevents them from "tak[ing] an active part in political management or in political campaigns." 211 The similarities between the abuses rectified by the
Hatch Act and the abuse still extant in the labor movement are
striking:
[T]he immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act
in 1939 . . . was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to
build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political
machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns
convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real
that substantial barriers should be raised against the party
in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using
the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its political
212
structure and political campaigns.
A legislative amendment to the LMRDA which limited the
power of the union staff "to build a powerful, invincible, and per20

6The proposals sketched in this section are not meant to be the final word.
Instead, it is hoped that these rather broad suggestions will stimulate future
discussion.
207
See notes 112-30 supra & accompanying text.
208oCh. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 U.S.C.).
209 The discussion in the text following this note is not meant to suggest that
an amendment to the LMRDA patterned after the Hatch Act is imminent. In
fact, significant congressional hostility to the Hatch Act has arisen in recent years.
In 1976, for example, both the House and Senate passed legislation watering down
the strictures of the Hatch Act considerably. 122 CoNe. thdc. 8549 (1976) (House
passage); id. 8850 (Senate passage). The House's attempt to override President
Ford's veto fell only 26 votes short. Id. 11,867.
The discussion does demonstrate, however, that the same policies which originally led Congress to enact the Hatch Act are also present in the union-election
setting today. And these policies-stemming from the power relationships between
employer and employee--continue to concern Congress despite its hostility to the
Hatch Act itself. For example, even the 1976 legislation would have prohibited
both outright coercion of employees by employers and "solicitation of political
contributions by superior officials." 122 CONG. REC. 8543 (1976) (remarks of
Rep. Clay). Thus, congressional hostility to the Hatch Act will not necessarily
carry over into the union setting.
210 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1976).
211 d. § 7324 (a) (2).
212 United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 565-66 (1973) (citations omitted). See also notes 132 & 133 supra &
accompanying text.
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haps corrupt political machine" 218 would undoubtedly aid the
development of union democracy. 214 But it is not a panacea. It
would do nothing, for instance, to further the political career of an
ambitious, but penniless rank-and-file challenger. Without funds,
the challenger is no match for any incumbent-whether or not the
union staff is neutralized. Thus, this Comment also proposes that
the unions themselves be encouraged to finance-in a nondiscriminatory fashion-the political campaigns of any "bona fide" candidate.
This idea has been applied on a limited basis already 215-the "candidates page" in the union newspaper is a good example 216-but it
should be legitimated and broadened in new legislation which
authorizes the use of union money as a major campaign resource.
The inadequacy of resources that plagues the rank-and-file challenger is not unique to union elections. The problem recurs in
many contexts, and the solution most frequently proposed is a form
of institutionalized funding. In the public arena, for example,
government subsidies 2 17 are often used to ensure some balance between incumbent and challenger. 2 18 An even more striking parallel
can be found in the corporate context. The movement toward
"corporate democracy" in the 1950's forced both courts 219 and
commentators 22 0 to confront the financial disparity between the
213 413 U.S. at 565.
2 14

But see Thirteen Years of Use, supra note 76, at 467-68 (suggesting that
the service staff should not be depoliticized, proposing instead that service-staff
positions be made elective).
215 See note 201 supra.
216
See Yablonski v. UMWV, 305 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1969) (supplementing
305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1969)); note 201 supra.
217 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9013, 9031-9042 (authorization of subsidies
from a special fund to eligible candidates in United States presidential primaries
and elections). These provisions were upheld in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
86-109 (1976).
218 See, e.g., Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN.
L. Rfv. 815 (1974), in which the author proposes the use of substantial campaign
subsidies to improve the challenger's position vis-A-vis the incumbent. The author
notes that subsidies would "aid both the incumbent and the challenger, but the
incumbent may have already reached a point of diminishing returns with his or
her public exposure, whereas an unknown opponent may be given a substantial
boost by such an opportunity." Id. 848. See generally A. IEAD, TnE COSTS OF
DamocnAcy 431-37 (1960); Agree, Public Financing after the Supreme Court
Decision, 425 ANrAs 134 (May 1976); Biden, Public Financing of Elections:
Legislative Proposals and Constitutional Questions, 69 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 1 (1974);
Fleischman, Public Financing of Election Campaigns: Constitutional Constraints on
Steps Toward Equality of PoliticalInfluence of Citizens, 52 N.C. L. R1,v. 349 (1973).
29 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 148 N.Y.S.2d
(1955).
220 See, e.g., F. EM.isoN & F. LATCHA , SsHr.
OLDr.R DF-mocAcy (1954);
Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty, 41
CArasw. L. REv. 393 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]; Friedman, Expenses of
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entrenched incumbent management, which had full access to the
corporate proxy machinery, 221 and the insurgent minority shareholder, who fought his proxy battles alone. 222 In the corporate area,

courts have used a "common benefit" theory to hold successful insurgents entitled to reimbursement by the corporation after the
"ecampaign."I 223
There is already precedent for extending the "common benefit"
theory from corporate to labor law; it has been applied in LMRDA
section 102 224 suits to justify union payments of members' attorney's
fees. 225 Although these cases concern litigation, not election, expenses, many of the same considerations apply. As the court in
Hall v. Cole noted:
Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUm. L. REV. 951 (1951); Note, Corporations:
Proxy Solicitation and the Payment of Expenses Incurred by Insurgent Shareholders Out of Corporation Funds, 36 Conrim. L.Q. 558 (1951) [hereinafter cited
as Proxy Solicitation]; Comment, Proxy Contests: Corporate Reimbursement of Insurgents' Expenses, 23 U. Cr-. L. REv. 682 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Proxy
Contests]; Note, Proxy Solicitation Costs and Corporate Control, 61 YAIX L.J. 229
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Proxy Costs].
221 Corporate office-holders, bound by their fiduciary duty to the corporation,
may not use corporate funds merely to perpetuate themselves in office, but may use
the corporate proxy machinery if (1) the contest involves a policy issue; (2) the
corporate funds are used to inform the shareholders about the policy issues; and
(3) the expenses are reasonable. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy
Machinery, 83 HAuv. L. tEiv. 1489, 1496 (1970).
222 Perhaps the best example of an effort to equalize the financial positions of
the individual shareholder and management is SEC rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8
(1979). That Securities and Exchange Commission regulation requires management
to include in its proxy statement certain shareholder proposals at no cost to the
individual shareholder. The provision is of limited relevance to this discussion,
however, because proposals relating to an election need not be included. Id.
14a-8(c) (8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (8) (1979).
22 3
See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Shareholders may reimburse insurgents who, after their election, succeed "in ridding a
corporation of a policy frowned upon by a majority of the stockholders."); Rosenfeld
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293,
148 N.Y.S.2d (1955) (shareholders who sued derivatively for "reasonable" sums paid
by corporation to successful insurgents for expenses incurred in proxy fight, denied
recovery).
Several commentators have extended this argument and taken the position that
unsuccessful insurgents also deserve reimbursement under a "common benefit"
theory. See, e.g., E. APa.Now & H. En,mox, Pnoxy CONTESTS FOR ConpORATE
CONTROL 575-77 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as E. AANow]; Friedman, supra
note 220, at 958; Comment, Proxy Contests, supra note 220, at 690; Note, Proxy
Costs, supra note 220, at 235. Contra, Note, Proxy Solicitation, supra note 220,
at 563-64.
224 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976).
225 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (Successful plaintiff in suit
against union can be awarded attorney's fees because "by vindicating his own
right, the successful litigant dispels the 'chill' cast upon the rights of others.");
notes 190-95 supra & accompanying text. Cf. Brennan v. United Steelworkers, 554
F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977) (insurgent candidate who, after losing election for
district director, intervened in Secretary of Labor's suit to overturn the election,
may be entitled to attorney's fees under "common benefit" rule).
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Not to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be
tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its
basic purpose. It is difficult for individual members of
labor unions to stand up and fight those who are in charge.
The latter have the treasury of the union at their command and the paid union counsel at their beck and call
while the member is on his own.

.

.

.

An individual

union member could not carry such a heavy financial
burden. Without counsel fees the grant of federal jurisdiction is but a gesture for few union members could
avail themselves of it.226
The considerations expressed in this Comment confirm the
need for union subsidization of its own election campaigns. Such
funding would lessen the importance of disparities in resources, and
could go far towards creating and maintaining some balance between incumbent and challenger. The availability of union funds
would also decrease the incentives to solicit contributions from outsiders, thereby strengthening notions of union autonomy.
The practical difficulties in implementing such a scheme, however, are formidable. Should union subsidization be a strictly voluntary form of election financing, and, if so, how can it be
encouraged? Who would be entitled to funding, and how much
money would be allocated to each candidate? Assuming only "bona
fide" candidates would receive reimbursement for their "reasonable expenses," how would these terms be defined?
Existing answers to these questions developed in other contexts
are not at all satisfactory. For example, the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act 227 allocates funds in varying amounts 228 to
candidates in major, minor, and new parties,2 29 but provides no
funds for independent candidates. Shareholder reimbursement in
the corporate area has produced a flood of proposed solutions.
These proposals have ranged from limiting reimbursement to candidates receiving some minimum percentage of the vote,230 to pro226412

U.S. at 13 (quoting Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777, 780-81 (2d Cir.

1972)).
227 I.R.C. §§ 9001-9013.
2281d. § 9004.
229 The statute categorizes a party according to the percentage of the total
popular vote its presidential candidate received in the prior election. Id.

§9002(6)-(8).
230 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 220, at 963; Comment, Proxy Contests,
supra note 220, at 690.
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portional reimbursement,2 1 to purely voluntary reimbursement at
23 2
the corporation's discretion.

Further, these proposed solutions to the inherent problems of
institutionalized campaign financing were all formulated in contexts
materially different from the union setting. First, permanent
parties-major, minor, or otherwise-are not a part of the union
political structure. 23 3 Thus, any union subsidization plan must
guard against frivolous candidacies by individuals who do not represent even a minority of the membership. Second, the concept of
"reimbursement" which pervades discussions of corporate democracy
is not as appropriate in the union context. The insurgent shareholder who funds a proxy fight with his own resources and expects
reimbursement after the fact may be in a better financial position
than the rank-and-file challenger who requires subsidization before
he can even start campaigning. Finally, one must ask whether any
incumbent union leadership would voluntarily adopt such a scheme,
and how it would be policed once adopted. Currently, the answers
must await serious legislative study.
VII. CONCLUSION

The legislative proposals sketched here are concededly roughhewn. There is no indication that any equitable election-financing
schemes either exist currently or are likely to be developed in the
near future-in the public or private arena. But it is time for the
Congress to re-evaluate section 4 01(g) of the LMRDA and begin
the task of drafting new and better legislation.
At the same time, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to confront the difficulties inherent in the provision as drafted and grapple
231

Two forms of proportional reimbursement are proposed in the literature.
The first would compare the votes and expenses of both management and insurgent
as follows:
management expenses

insurgent expenses

allowed

allowed

votes secured by

votes secured by

management
insurgent
Emerson, supra note 220, at 436.
The second proportional reimbursement proposal would rely on the percentage
of votes received by the insurgent. For example, any insurgent who receives 50%
of the vote would receive 100% reimbursement; an insurgent receiving 25%of the
vote, however, would be entitled to only 50%reimbursement. See Comment, Proxy
Contests, supra note 220, at 690.
232 The result of such a proposal, in practical terms, would be to provide
reimbursement only to successful candidates. Eisenberg, supra note 221, at 1512.
2 33
See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
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with them aggressively and imaginatively. The court in Marshall
v. Local 20, International Brotherhood of Teamsters-3 4 failed to
meet this challenge. It is hoped that the next court which examines
the problem will look beyond the "plain meaning" of the statute to
the even plainer-and harsher-realities of internal-union-election
financing.
234

101 L.R.R.M. 2195 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).

